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SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER J. MINER
TO BE SUBMITTED AT JOINT HEARING ON JULY 11, 1990
The addition of the words "whether published or unpublished"
to section 107 of Title 17, the "fair use" statute, is
unnecessary, if intended to permit fair use of unpublished
material; incompatible with the existing statute, if intended to
afford equal dignity to published and unpublished matter; and
ineffective to resolve the policy concerns articulated by the
sponsors. The amendment is unnecessary if its only purpose is to
permit fair use of unpublished material. The present statute
allows the fair use of any copyrighted work, although the nature
of the work is one of the fair use factors to be considered. The
other factors are purpose and character of the use; the amount
and substantiality of the portions used; and the effect of the
use upon the potential market. No court ever has said that
unpublished material cannot be the subject of fair use.
Read in the context of section 107 as it stands, the
amendment appears to be intended to raise unpublished material to
the level of published material in the application of fair use
doctrine. If this is the intention of the amendment, then the
amendment is inconsistent with the fair use factor just referred
to, the nature of the work. This factor tells us that there is
an important distinction between published and unpublished works,
and the courts have offered far less fair use protection to
unpublished works. The important reason for·the distinction lies
in the right of an author to control the first public appearance
of his or her work. Even in its present form, the statute allows
fair use of an unpublished work stolen from an author. The
amendment indicates no disapproval of such a use.
The concerns of the sponsors relate to the stringent
restrictions imposed by the courts on the use of unpublished
material by historians, researchers and biographers. An
examination of court decisions reveals that the unpublished
nature of a work has been a key factor in defeating fair use
claims. The recently-ratified Berne Convention seems to set up
another barrier against the fair use of unpublished material.
Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason to allow the heirs of
historical figures long departed to forestall the use of material
created generations earlier but recently discovered by a scholar
conducting research in some remote archive. The solution to that
problem does not lie in this bill.
I propose a solution that is compatible with the provisions
of the Berne Convention, that would eliminate the difficulties
encountered by courts in deciding fair use claims involving
unpublished works, and that would accommodate the needs of
scholars to gain access to material of historical and public
interest. I would limit fair use to published and publicly
disseminated material. I would define publicly disseminated
material to include any letters sent without a requirement of
confidentiality and any documents, including letters, that have
been in existence for a certain period of years without having
been copyrighted. For the rest, I would rely on the freedom of
access to facts and ideas contained in the undisseminated
material. In this way, the balance between the rights of authors
and the rights of society would be maintained.
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I am happy to accept your invitation to comment on H.R. 4263
and s. 2370, identical bills providing for the amendment of
section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code, the "fair use"
statute. The amendment merely would add the words "whether
published or unpublished" following the phrase "fair use of a
copyrighted work." The bills are driven by concerns arising from
recent court decisions said to unduly restrict the use of
unpublished, copyrighted material. I am the author of one of
those decisions. One sponsor has expressed the hope that the
proposed legislation will "forestall the adoption of a broad and
inflexible rule against fair use of unpublished material."
The perception here seems to be that there is a court-fueled
trend toward depriving scholars and historical researchers of the
use of letters, diaries and other unpublished writings vital to
their work. According to the House sponsor, the "amendment would
clarify that section 107 applies equally to unpublished as well
as published works." If that is its purpose, it is inconsistent
with the unamended portion of section 107. I respectfully
suggest, moreover, that the fair use doctrine cannot and should
not be applied to published and unpublished material equally. I
think that the statement should be amended to limit fair use to
published and publicly disseminated works, a proposal advanced in
my article: Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play in
the October 1989 issue of the Journal of the Copyright Society of
the U.S.A. With an appropriate definition of "publicly
disseminated" added to the statute, the concerns of the sponsors
would be allayed, the purposes of the fair use doctrine would be
fulfilled, and societal interests would be served.
It is important first to examine what fair use is and what
it is not. Fair use, known as fair abridgement in early English
law, permits the limited use of a copyrighted work without
liability for infringement of the copyright. It has been
characterized as an equitable rule of reason and is necessary for
such purposes as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship and research. Fair use is not a doctrine to be
invoked in order to gain access to facts and ideas embodied in
copyrighted work, because the protection of copyright does not

extend to facts and ideas. It extends only to expression. There
thus is struck, in the words of the Supreme Court, "a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act." Fair use, then, is a limited right to use the
expression of another. Whether a use is fair is largely
committed to the judgment of the courts, broadly guided by the
factors set out in section 107 of Title 17.
I suggest that the proposed amendment to section 107 bears
close examination in light of the second fair use factor, which
remains undisturbed by the amendment. That factor, the nature of
the copyrighted work, requires the courts to take into account
whether the work is published or unpublished. History and
precedent tell us that the scope of fair use is narrower in the
case of an unpublished copyrighted work than it is in the case of
a published copyrighted work. The amendment seems to offer equal
dignity to both types of works and therefore is inconsistent with
the present application of the fair use doctrine. One can only
guess at the confusion that would be engendered by the coexistence of these incompatible provisions.
If the purpose of the bill is simply to assure that fair use
can be made of unpublished copyrighted material, it is
unnecessary. Fair use of unpublished material already is
permitted. Section 107 allows the fair use of any copyrighted
work although, as previously noted, the nature of the work is a
factor to be considered by the courts in applying the doctrine.
Also to be considered, of course, are the other three statutory
factors: the purpose and character of the use, the amount and
substantiality of the portions used, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market.
There is some indication in the legislative history of
section 107 of an intention to restate existing fair use doctrine
and not to change it in any respect. A persuasive case can be
made that the then existing doctrine prohibited the fair use of
unpublished but not voluntarily disseminated works. The statute
as enacted did not make the distinction, leaving it to the courts
to weigh the unpublished nature of the work in the fair use
balance. For good reason, the courts have chosen to afford far
less fair use protection to those who use unpublished material
then to those who use published material. It is, after all, an
author's right to control the first public appearance of his or
her work. An author must have the right to refine, revise and
discard a work prior to publication. The ability of an author to
withhold a work from public dissemination just as long as he or
she deems it proper to do so implicates notions of privacy,
freedom to refrain from speaking and control of material. At
bottom here is a substantial property interest.
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Essential to an understanding of the effect of the proposed
amendment is the fact that the unpublished material for which a
claim of fair use is made sometimes is stolen material. In
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the leading case on fair use,
the Supreme Court spoke of the exploitation of a "purloined
manuscript," the manuscript being the memoirs of President Gerald
Ford. In Salinger v. Random House, the biographer gained access
to certain letters written by J.D. Salinger lodged in a library
by promising not to copy them. New Era Publications v. Henry
Holt and Co. involved the use of the writings of L. Ron Hubbard
apparently acquired from the Church of Scientology by
misappropriation or conversion. There is nothing in the present
statute or in the cases interpreting it to indicate that
purloined material cannot be the subject of fair use. That the
exploited text is stolen simply is not a factor to be considered
in applying the fair use doctrine under section 107 as it stands.
The amendment proposed, which seeks only to elevate the status of
unpublished material, does nothing to rectify this situation and
actually exacerbates it.
The concerns of historians and researchers in regard to the
stringent restrictions on the use of unpublished material is
understandable. It is especially understandable to me, because
my wife is an historian who has undertaken considerable original
research. Although no court has said that unpublished material
never can be the subject of fair use, it is clear that the
unpublished nature of a work is a key factor in defeating a fair
use claim. It makes no sense, however, to allow the heirs of
historical figures long departed to forestall, by the simple
expedient of obtaining a copyright, the use of material created
generations earlier and discovered in some remote archive by a
scholar researching original sources. The solution to the
problem thus posed is not, in my view, to elevate unpublished
works to equal standing with published works in the fair use
analysis. As I have demonstrated, such an approach would
encourage the use of purloined material, deprive authors of
important rights and encroach upon interests that should be
protected. Moreover, the recently-ratified Berne Convention
seems to exclude the use of unpublished material altogether. It
allows only "quotations from a work which already has been made
available to the public, provided that their making is compatible
with fair practice."
I propose a solution that is compatible with the provisions
of the Berne Convention, that would eliminate the difficulties
encountered by courts in deciding fair use claims involving
unpublished works, and that would accommodate the needs of
scholars to gain access to material of historical and public
interest. I would limit fair use to published and publicly
disseminated material. I would define publicly disseminated
3

material to include any letters sent without a requirement of
confidentiality and any documents, including letters, that have
been in existence for a certain period of years without having
been copyrighted. For the rest, I would rely on the freedom of
access to facts and ideas contained in the undisseminated
material. In this way, the balance between the rights of authors
and the rights of society would be maintained.
It always should be remembered, as the Supreme Court has
reminded us, that "[b]y establishing a marketable right to the
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas." It also should be
recognized that strict application of the copyright law could
defeat incremental progress, to the detriment of the public good.
The fair use doctrine was designed to avoid that result.
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